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Historical Context: From Soviet Occupation to Independent States
Estonia and Latvia, two small Baltic states, endured nearly five decades of Soviet occupation starting in 1940. During that era, Moscow’s policies of Russification and forced migration planted a large Russian-speaking population in both countries. Even after regaining independence in 1991, roughly a quarter of Estonia’s people and one-third of Latvia’s remained Russian native speakers. Many were Soviet-era settlers and their descendants, some of whom did not take local citizenship – tens of thousands remained stateless or kept Russian passports even into the 2020s. This demographic reality has been a sensitive issue from the start: the new governments required language and civic tests for citizenship, aiming to integrate these minorities into Estonian and Latvian society while allaying security concerns.
The legacy of Soviet rule also created a diaspora of Estonians and Latvians abroad. Thousands fled westward during World War II and the Cold War, settling in North America and elsewhere. These expatriate communities preserved their languages and culture in exile and lobbied Western governments to not forget the Baltic nations' plight. Notably, Baltic diaspora activists in the U.S. were instrumental in keeping the cause of Baltic independence alive – participating in initiatives like the Assembly of Captive European Nations and advocating for non-recognition of the Soviet annexation. Their efforts paid off: when independence was restored, Estonian leaders openly acknowledged the crucial role of the diaspora. In 1998, a member of Estonia’s parliament stated, “no one should underestimate the role of Estonians abroad” in restoring independence, and former Prime Minister Mart Laar affirmed that “the Estonian nation will continue to need you”. This history set the stage for a enduring bond between the Baltic homelands and their diaspora communities, defined by shared values and mutual support.
Russian Influence and Modern Security Challenges
Fast-forward to today: Estonia and Latvia find themselves NATO’s easternmost flank, bordering an increasingly aggressive Russia. Moscow’s war against Ukraine in 2022 was a seismic event in the region, triggering what officials in Tallinn and Riga describe as a “wartime mentality” in their policy-making. Security agencies warn that the Kremlin has stepped up its hybrid warfare on the Baltics – a mix of disinformation campaigns, cyber attacks, espionage and other subversive tactics. The sizable Russian-speaking communities are seen as a potential weak spot that Moscow might exploit to destabilize these countries from within. Indeed, Russian propaganda explicitly targets these minorities (often in their native tongue via state media or social networks) to sow division and mistrust. Analysts note that Russia “weaponizes virtually every sphere of human activity – language, culture, sports, and so on” to influence Russian speakers in Estonia and Latvia.
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A long-feared scenario illustrates the concern: the so-called “Narva scenario.” Security experts have warned for years that Russia could attempt to grab Narva – an Estonian city with a 95% Russian-speaking majority on the Russian border – under the pretext of “protecting the Russian-speaking population,” mirroring tactics used in Crimea or Donbas. While most Russian-speaking Balts are loyal citizens, the Kremlin relentlessly tries to manipulate this group. Surveys show a stark split in attitudes toward the Ukraine war: ethnic Estonians and Latvians overwhelmingly blame and fear Russia, whereas the Russian-speaking minority (especially older generations) are more ambivalent and pessimistic about Ukraine’s cause. Some have even echoed Moscow’s narratives. For example, before Estonia banned Russian-language education, certain local activists in Narva protested the removal of Soviet monuments and the switch to Estonian-language schooling, claiming their culture was under attack. Such tensions reveal how identity and security interlink in the Baltic context. Leaders in Riga and Tallinn are keenly aware that if segments of their society remain alienated or influenced by Kremlin propaganda, it could undermine national unity in a crisis. As one Estonian official put it, ensuring the “entire population” is on the state’s side is a matter of national survival when facing an aggressive neighbor.
Recent Russian provocations have only heightened the sense of urgency. In late 2023 and 2024, Russian military aircraft and drones repeatedly violated Baltic airspace, testing NATO’s reactions. Western officials now openly worry that a direct clash with Moscow, however unlikely, is no longer unthinkable – and any such conflict would put Estonia and Latvia on the front line. This ominous backdrop has prompted the Baltic states to double-down on defensive measures at home. Beyond bolstering their militaries and hosting NATO battle groups, they are focusing on fortifying the home front against subversion. The central challenge: reduce Moscow’s leverage over their Russian-speaking populations and “curb Moscow’s sway” on Baltic soil.
Integration and Policy Responses to Curb Kremlin Influence
Since 2022, both Estonia and Latvia have launched an array of policies aimed at integrating society and blunting Russian influence. These steps, while bold, reflect a view that extraordinary times call for firm measures. Key recent actions include:
- Phasing out Russian-language education: Both countries are transitioning schools to use only the national language (Estonian or Latvian) as the language of instruction. This reform is meant to ensure that young people from Russian-speaking families become proficient in the state language and feel part of the national civic identity. (In Narva, for example, over 40 teachers lost their jobs in 2024 for insufficient Estonian skills after the new rules took effect.)
- Tightening citizenship and residency requirements: Latvia amended its immigration laws to require Russian citizens living in the country to pass a basic Latvian language exam and undergo security checks or face losing residency rights. By 2023–24, about 2,600 Russian nationals had left Latvia and hundreds more faced deportation for failing the new requirements. Similarly, Estonia barred non-EU foreign nationals (a category that includes many Russian passport-holders) from voting in local elections, stripping non-citizen residents of political influence.
- Curtailing Russian-linked organizations: Both governments moved to sever institutional ties with Moscow. Latvia passed a law in 2022 formally separating the Latvian Orthodox Church from the Russian Orthodox Church, to prevent Moscow’s patriarchate from exerting influence through religion. Estonia followed with similar legislation by 2025. Authorities have also cracked down on local NGOs or individuals suspected of collaborating with Russian intelligence or spreading Kremlin-funded propaganda, sometimes revoking residence permits of those involved.
- Acknowledging the security dimension of integration: All these efforts are explicitly justified in security terms. Officials argue that encouraging greater integration of the Russian-speaking minority is not only a social policy but a national security imperative. Reducing linguistic and informational divides is seen as critical to deprive Moscow of a pretext to “defend” compatriots or a channel to destabilize society. As Estonia’s Internal Security Deputy Secretary Joosep Kaasik stated, “We cannot – and should not – ignore the fact that part of our population is systematically targeted by propaganda... For our small nation, countering this long-term threat is a question of self-preservation”.
These measures have not been without controversy. Moscow angrily denounces any moves that diminish the status of the Russian language or influence, accusing the Baltics of discriminating against Russian speakers. Russian state media amplifies such narratives to claim Russophones are under attack and in need of “protection”. This propaganda angle is worrisome – as one analyst noted, policies taken “given [the Baltics’] ...security concerns and historical experience” can be a double-edged sword, potentially giving the Kremlin a propaganda hook to justify aggression in the name of defending “oppressed” compatriots. Even some Western bodies, like the Council of Europe, have criticized Estonia and Latvia’s language laws for minority education. Baltic leaders respond that, while they value minority rights, the current security environment leaves them no choice but to prioritize cohesion and resilience. They point out that Russian information warfare is relentless; thus safeguarding national security and social cohesion takes precedence. In their eyes, the real threat to minority communities comes from the Kremlin’s manipulation, not from integration policies. The mantra in both Tallinn and Riga is that unity is strength: only a populace that speaks a common language, subscribes to a shared civic identity, and trusts its democratic institutions can withstand external pressure in a time of crisis.

International Alignments: NATO and Western Solidarity
On the global stage, Estonia and Latvia’s response to Russian pressure has been to hug their allies ever closer. Both countries are active members of NATO and the EU, leveraging those partnerships for security guarantees. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Baltic states have stood out as some of Kyiv’s staunchest supporters – providing military aid far above what much larger countries have given (relative to their GDP) and advocating for tough sanctions on Moscow. This uncompromising stance is rooted in their historical memory and immediate security calculus. Latvian and Estonian leaders frequently remind Western partners that today Ukraine, tomorrow the Baltics is a scenario they must prevent at all costs. As Latvian Prime Minister Krišjānis Kariņš bluntly put it, “If Ukraine falls, we will be next.” The urgency has translated into action: NATO has reinforced its eastern flank with multinational battlegroups in the Baltics, and both Estonia and Latvia have ramped up defense spending well above the alliance’s 2% GDP benchmark. Such steps are meant to deter any Kremlin adventurism. Indeed, U.S. officials acknowledge that if the Baltic states were not under NATO’s collective defense umbrella, Putin might have already tried to invade them – a point made starkly by U.S. Congressman Don Bacon, who noted that Putin “denies their sovereignty as it is” and would have acted on his imperial ambitions had NATO not stood in the way. This reality underscores why international solidarity is existential for these small states.
Notably, the Baltic diaspora in North America has played a behind-the-scenes role in shoring up this Western support. Estonian- and Latvian-American organizations spent years lobbying for NATO enlargement and continue to work with lawmakers to ensure the alliance’s commitments remain ironclad. For example, the American Latvian Association’s “Call to Action” unit regularly mobilizes Latvian-Americans to inform U.S. Congress members about Baltic security issues – stressing that Putin’s aggression poses an “existential threat to the Baltics” and urging unwavering U.S. backing for NATO and Baltic defense. Likewise, the Estonian American National Council and the Joint Baltic American National Committee coordinate advocacy that emphasizes a strong transatlantic alliance as the cornerstone protecting Estonia and Latvia from Russian aggression. In Canada, too, figures in the Estonian and Latvian diaspora (such as journalists and policy experts of Baltic heritage) have raised their voices to keep their adopted country aligned with robust support for the Baltics and for Ukraine. In short, the international facet of responding to Russian influence isn’t just about state-to-state relations – it’s also bolstered by citizens and émigrés who serve as informal ambassadors for the Baltic cause.
The Diaspora Dimension: Engagement and Solidarity Abroad
What do these security pressures mean for the Estonian and Latvian diasporas, particularly those in North America? In many ways, it has reinvigorated their connection to the homeland and their resolve to help. The diaspora experience has always been intertwined with the homeland’s fate – after all, most Estonian- and Latvian-Americans are descendants of those who fled Soviet terror, or later emigrants who left in pursuit of opportunity but never severed their emotional ties. Today, as Estonia and Latvia face down an aggressive Russia once again, diaspora communities from Toronto to New York find themselves rallying in support. They follow news from Tallinn and Riga with intense interest, celebrate each policy that strengthens their ancestral home’s security, and voice concern at any signs of Western wavering. The war in Ukraine, launched on February 24, 2022 (Estonia’s Independence Day, poignantly enough), deeply resonated with Baltic diaspora families. Many elder diaspora members vividly remember the stories of 1940 and 1944 – of how the world’s abandonment led to their nations’ subjugation. “Estonians endured almost 50 years of Soviet occupation and understand too well what it means to be abandoned by allies and occupied by Russia,” reads a statement by the Estonian American National Council, reflecting the hard-earned wisdom that diaspora carry. This historical memory has translated into a passionate stance: never again. Baltic diaspora groups have thus thrown themselves into advocacy and education efforts wherever they live, determined to ensure their adopted countries stand firm against Kremlin aggression.

Diaspora engagement takes many forms. There’s high-profile political advocacy – for instance, Baltic-American groups organizing “Baltic Advocacy Days” on Capitol Hill to meet with U.S. legislators, or Canadian-Estonian activists like Marcus Kolga speaking out on disinformation and foreign policy. In 2022, Estonia’s Foreign Minister convened a Global Estonians virtual forum and thanked expatriates for maintaining a “close link to Estonia”. He highlighted that every Estonian abroad “carries our culture, memory and values,” and called on them to help by pressuring their governments to provide more weapons to Ukraine and bolster NATO’s stance, calling the war’s outcome “an existential issue for us”. The message was clear: just as the diaspora once helped free the Baltics from Soviet rule, now they can help keep the Baltics free by aiding Ukraine and fortifying Western resolve. The response from diaspora communities was enthusiastic. Estonian and Latvian associations in the U.S. and Canada have been fundraising for humanitarian aid, organizing rallies in support of Ukraine, and sending open letters to officials. They leverage their unique position as citizens of Western countries and members of Baltic nations to ensure that policy-makers understand what’s at stake. One American Latvian Association initiative even makes it as easy as a few clicks to contact Congress, emphasizing that spending a few minutes to advocate is “one of the most important things you can do for the Baltics: Ensure their security”.
Moreover, diaspora communities continue to preserve the cultural front that Russia once tried to erase. They maintain Estonian and Latvian heritage schools, folk dance groups, and newspapers (such as Vaba Eesti Sõna in the U.S. and Latvija Amerikā in Canada), thereby keeping the national identity vibrant abroad. This cultural vitality in the diaspora complements the integration efforts back home: while Estonia and Latvia work to strengthen national identity among all their citizens, the diaspora demonstrates the enduring pull of that identity even half a world away. Indeed, the Baltic diasporas have become exemplars of integration in their own right – integrating successfully into American or Canadian society while fiercely retaining their Estonian or Latvian spirit. This gives them credibility when they speak about the importance of language and civic unity; they know the value of assimilation without losing one’s roots. Baltic diaspora voices often defend their homelands on the international stage by explaining why policies like language requirements are about preserving a nation’s existence, not oppressing minorities – a narrative that counters the Kremlin’s line.
Conclusion: Unity at Home and Abroad
In the face of big pressures from their giant neighbor, Estonia and Latvia have shown a remarkable resolve. These small states are tightening the seams of their societies – through language, education, and security policies – to preempt Russia’s divide-and-conquer tactics. It’s a delicate balance: they must protect minority rights and maintain democratic values even while guarding against very real threats. The historical context cannot be ignored: having once lost their independence to Moscow, Estonians and Latvians know that national unity is their first line of defense. As one expert observed, for these nations “countering this long-term threat is a question of self-preservation”. Their actions today, controversial or not, stem from the instinct to survive as free societies.
Equally striking is how the Baltic diasporas have rallied in this effort. The Estonian and Latvian communities in North America may be oceans away, but they remain tightly connected to their ancestral homelands’ destiny. From lobbying in Washington for stronger Baltic defenses to amplifying truthful narratives in the information war, diaspora members have become an integral part of the resistance to Russian influence. Their dual identity has proven to be an asset: as Americans or Canadians they urge their governments to stand by Estonia and Latvia, and as Estonians or Latvians by heritage they reinforce the morale of their kin and contribute ideas, expertise, and cultural continuity. This synergy between the homeland and its far-flung sons and daughters is a powerful one – a force that Moscow has failed to reckon with.
Looking ahead, the experiences of Estonia and Latvia carry lessons for many small states with larger aggressive neighbors. One lesson is the importance of alliances and international support; another is the need for internal cohesion and integration. Perhaps just as important is the role of diaspora solidarity. In the Baltic case, the global Estonian and Latvian communities have shown that national security is everybody’s business, not only those living within a country’s borders. As long as these bonds remain strong, Russia’s attempts to undermine Estonia and Latvia – whether through military intimidation or the more insidious spread of influence – will meet the resilience of not just two nations of a few million people, but an even larger family united by history and hope. The message sent by both the Baltic capitals and their diaspora is one Vladimir Putin would do well to heed: we are small, but we are not alone.