Baltic States Embrace Nuclear Power for Energy Security and Climate Goals

In February 2025, the Baltics achieved a major milestone by desynchronizing from the Russian power grid and syncing with the Continental European network, bolstering their energy independence‍. Now, each Baltic nation is developing plans – notably small modular reactors (SMRs) – to ensure a stable, domestic supply of low-carbon electricity. This article provides an in-depth look at the latest nuclear energy developments in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in 2025, and places them in context with regional energy security goals, Poland’s parallel nuclear program, and the Nordic countries’ strategies. Recent data and events illustrate how nuclear power is increasingly seen as a crucial piece of the Baltics’ future energy puzzle, even as public debates continue over its risks and benefits.

Estonia: Pioneering SMRs for a Post-Oil Shale Era

Estonia is at the forefront of the Baltic nuclear pivot, driven by the need to replace its aging oil-shale power plants and meet climate targets. In May 2025, Estonia’s government formally launched a spatial planning and environmental impact assessment for a proposed 600 MWe nuclear power plant using GE Hitachi’s BWRX-300 SMR technology‍. This followed an application by Estonian startup Fermi Energia to begin the state planning process, which the government approved as a “significant step forward” in Estonia’s nuclear development. The planning area spans several coastal municipalities in Lääne-Viru and Ida-Viru counties, where local councils have already voted to support hosting a reactor. Such community buy-in reflects extensive outreach by Fermi Energia, which has helped build public trust in the project.

Key milestones in Estonia’s SMR initiative include site selection studies (2025–2027) focusing on two locations – near the village of Kunda and the village of Aa – which will be evaluated for infrastructure and environmental suitability. If a site is finalized, Fermi Energia plans to apply for a construction permit by 2029, aiming to have the first of two BWRX-300 reactors in operation by 2035. This timeline aligns with Estonia’s goal to phase out polluting oil-shale power by the mid-2030s. To support these ambitions, Estonia has been methodically developing its nuclear governance: in 2024 the Riigikogu (parliament) passed a resolution mandating that nuclear energy be considered in the national development plan through 2035 to ensure security of supply. In early 2025, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) provided legislative assistance to Estonia as it drafts a comprehensive nuclear energy law and regulatory framework.

Estonia’s approach is notably collaborative and international. Fermi Energia has secured partnerships with experienced industry players abroad. It chose the GE Hitachi BWRX-300 design after a feasibility study and competitive bidding, announced in February 2023. The company has since signed agreements with Finland’s Fortum and Belgium’s Tractebel for feasibility cooperation, and Sweden’s Vattenfall even took a minority stake in Fermi with a €1 million investment. In 2022, Canada’s OPG subsidiary Laurentis Energy began advising on SMR construction planning. In April 2025, South Korea’s Samsung C&T signed on as a potential engineering, procurement and construction partner for two BWRX-300 units. By September 2025, Canada’s Aecon had also partnered with Fermi to develop a “capable reactor building team” modeled on the successful Darlington SMR project in Ontario. These partnerships are positioning Estonia to leverage global expertise – for example, replicating the Canadian SMR experience – which could streamline its own project implementation. ** A rendering of a GE Hitachi BWRX-300 small modular reactor power plant. Estonia has selected this 300 MWe SMR design and begun site planning, with hopes of commissioning two units by the mid-2030s.】

Critically, Estonia’s nuclear push has enjoyed broad public and political support. A government poll in early 2023 found about 75% of Estonians in favor of building a nuclear plant, with only 17% opposed. By late 2024, nearly 59% of Estonian respondents in an EU survey believed nuclear energy would have a positive effect on their life in the next 20 years. This marks a dramatic upswing from just a few years prior – a 2022 poll showed 68% support for considering SMRs (up from 54% in 2021). Such sentiment stems from a mix of climate concerns and geopolitics: Estonians see nuclear as a way to produce reliable, carbon-free power domestically and end reliance on imported electricity. Notably, turning away from oil shale has already turned Estonia from a net power exporter to an importer as of 2018. Nuclear power could reverse that trend. As Climate Minister Tõnis Mölder put it when launching a government working group, “to increase Estonia’s energy security, sustainability and competitiveness and achieve the 2050 climate targets, the introduction of nuclear energy would be one of the possible solutions”. In line with this vision, Estonia joined France’s “Nuclear Energy Alliance” of pro-nuclear EU states in 2023 and partnered with the U.S. under the FIRST (Foundational Infrastructure for Responsible Use of SMR Technology) program to build capacity. With political consensus forming and concrete planning underway, Estonia may well become the first of the Baltic nations to realize a new nuclear power station on its soil.

Latvia: Weighing Nuclear Energy Amid Renewables Growth

In Latvia, the drive toward nuclear energy is more tentative but has gained traction in 2025. Latvia has long relied on a high share of renewables – especially hydropower – in its electricity mix. In 2023, thanks to abundant rainfall, local generation met 88% of Latvia’s consumption, and a remarkable 77.6% of electricity produced came from renewable sources (mostly large hydro). However, this dependence on weather-dependent hydro and imported fossil gas (which still made up 22% of generation in 2023) exposes Latvia to variability and energy security risks. The looming disconnection from the Russian/Belarus grid – completed in early 2025 – underscored the need for more stable domestic power sources and grid balancing solutions. While Latvia is aggressively expanding wind and solar and even installing large battery systems for storage, the government is also exploring nuclear energy as a complement to achieve a reliable, fossil-free mix.

In March 2024, Latvia’s Ministry of Climate and Energy presented an informative report on nuclear power development opportunities. This report outlined two scenarios: (1) participating in a nuclear project jointly with Estonia (either as a co-developer or investor), or (2) developing an independent small modular reactor project in Latvia. The Ministry’s conclusion was that the most desirable path would be to partner with Estonia’s SMR initiative, assuming the Saeima (parliament) gives a green light to proceed with nuclear energy at all. Essentially, Latvia could buy a stake in Estonia’s planned BWRX-300 plant or commit to offtake its power, rather than start from scratch. This cooperative approach would capitalize on Estonia’s head start and help share costs and expertise – a pragmatic option for a country of Latvia’s size.

Latvia’s parliament has begun to debate the nuclear question. The presentation of the Ministry’s report on March 12, 2024 opened formal discussions in the Saeima. Around the same time, in Estonia, lawmakers were working on a nuclear energy law and recognizing the urgent need for new firm capacity as oil shale is phased out. These parallel debates suggest a regional consensus may emerge. Indeed, Latvia is staying closely aligned with its neighbors: in October 2025, Latvia’s climate and energy minister Kaspars Melnis joined counterparts from Estonia, Finland, Sweden, and Poland in signing a joint Nordic-Baltic declaration highlighting nuclear power’s role in boosting energy security and phasing out fossil fuels. Earlier in 2025, Latvia also celebrated, alongside Estonia and Lithuania, the successful synchronization of the Baltic grid with Europe – a move that U.S. and Baltic officials noted will be bolstered by deploying innovative nuclear technologies like SMRs to provide secure baseload power for the region.

Public opinion in Latvia, however, is still in flux. Unlike Estonia’s clear pro-nuclear majority, Latvians have historically been lukewarm on nuclear energy – influenced by the absence of any domestic nuclear tradition and the memory of Chernobyl’s fallout across the Baltics. A 2023 poll by the Ignalina plant’s institute found only 42% of Lithuanians (a neighboring proxy) supported new nuclear development, and Latvian figures are likely similar or lower at this early stage. To educate and gauge public sentiment, Latvia held an International Conference “Nuclear Energy for Latvia 2025” on May 21, 2025, which highlighted growing interest in nuclear as a way to meet climate targets and strengthen independence. Still, skepticism remains strong among environmental NGOs and some politicians. Critics argue that pursuing nuclear – especially unproven SMR designs – could be “a costly solution that would delay the transition” to a 100% renewables-based system. The Bankwatch Network, for example, warns that no SMR has operated commercially yet, and first-of-a-kind reactors could turn out even more expensive than conventional nuclear due to lost economies of scale. They also point out the long timelines: even the Ministry’s optimistic estimate is 15 years to develop SMRs in Latvia, given the need to build regulatory capacity and a skilled workforce from the ground up. Investing heavily in a project that delivers only in the 2040s, critics say, might siphon funds away from renewables that can be deployed faster. Additionally, security concerns are raised: some argue that a few large power plants present concentrated targets for disasters or attacks, whereas a distributed grid of smaller renewable installations might be more resilient.

Despite these debates, Latvia’s leadership is keeping the nuclear option open as a “last resort” for deep decarbonization. The Latvian Energy Strategy 2050, approved in 2023, leaves room for nuclear energy if needed to achieve climate and security goals. Moreover, Latvia is already engaging with international partners on nuclear know-how. It joined the U.S.-launched FIRST initiative in 2022 for SMR capacity-building, signaling an interest in at least learning about advanced reactors. The IAEA has reviewed Latvia’s nuclear emergency preparedness (as Latvia hosts a decommissioned Soviet research reactor site) to lay groundwork for any future nuclear facilities. In sum, while no firm decision has been made by the end of 2025, Latvia is carefully assessing nuclear energy’s merits and risks. The coming years will likely see more public consultation and possibly a political decision by the late 2020s on whether to join Estonia’s project or pursue its own. For now, Latvia is hedging – expanding renewables and interconnections as the primary path, but ready to pivot to nuclear if regional realities make it necessary for a stable, independent energy supply.

Lithuania: Renewed Nuclear Ambitions After Ignalina

Lithuania has a unique nuclear legacy among the Baltics. It once hosted one of the world’s most powerful nuclear plants – the Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant, a Soviet-built twin RBMK reactor that provided cheap, abundant power to the region in the 1980s and 1990s. However, Ignalina’s Chernobyl-type reactors were deemed unsafe by Western standards, and as a condition of joining the EU, Lithuania shut down Ignalina’s two units in 2004 and 2009. The closures left Lithuania suddenly reliant on electricity imports (largely from Latvia, Russia, and later Western sources) and had a significant socio-economic impact on the Visaginas region. Plans to build a modern replacement reactor at Visaginas – in partnership with Latvia, Estonia, and initially Poland – were launched but ultimately stalled in 2012 after a non-binding public referendum showed lukewarm support. By 2016 the regional project was discontinued. For a decade, Lithuania’s nuclear aspirations lay dormant as it focused on expanding renewables and an LNG terminal for gas.

Fast forward to the mid-2020s, and Lithuania is reconsidering nuclear power with fresh eyes. The geopolitical shock of 2022 (war in Ukraine) and Belarus’s controversial launch of the Astravets nuclear plant just across Lithuania’s border have underscored Lithuania’s desire for true energy self-reliance. In 2024, the Lithuanian government signaled a policy shift: it sees advanced nuclear technologies, especially SMRs, as a possible part of its net-zero 2050 vision. Concrete steps followed. In November 2024, Lithuania’s energy minister (at the time Dainius Kreivys) and U.S. Energy Secretary Jennifer Granholm signed an agreement in Washington to cooperate on developing Lithuania’s nuclear power program, with a focus on Generation IV small modular reactors. This made Lithuania the first country to partner with the U.S. DOE on Gen-IV SMR deployment, highlighting its “ambitious objective” of a net-zero energy system by 2050. The U.S. agreed to help with technical assessments – including market analysis, siting, and financing options – in the lead-up to a Lithuanian decision on new reactors by 2028. Such a decision, if affirmative, could see Lithuania building its first 500 MW of nuclear capacity by 2038, and additional units by 2050, according to a national strategy approved in 2024.

Momentum continued into 2025. In July 2025, Lithuania’s state enterprise Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant (INPP, now responsible for decommissioning the old reactors) signed a memorandum of understanding with UK-based nuclear company Newcleo to study the feasibility of deploying Newcleo’s advanced fast reactors in Lithuania. Newcleo is developing a lead-cooled fast reactor (the LFR-AS-200, a 200 MWe SMR) designed to run on recycled nuclear fuel, which could potentially use some of Ignalina’s spent fuel stockpile as input. This technology’s appeal to Lithuania lies in both energy generation and waste reduction – it promises to help consume nuclear waste and close the fuel cycle. At the MOU signing, Energy Minister Žygimantas Vaičiūnas stressed that Lithuania wants to “preserve expertise from Ignalina and use it for the development of advanced nuclear technologies”. He acknowledged such projects are long-term endeavors but argued that Lithuania should “not miss the opportunity to assess” innovative reactors now. By engaging in pilot projects like Newcleo’s, Lithuania aims to position itself at the cutting edge of nuclear innovation, while also finding a purposeful solution for its existing spent fuel, which is currently stored in casks at Ignalina. Newcleo’s CEO noted the partnership could contribute to “sustainable solutions for radioactive waste management and energy security in Europe”.

On the domestic front, the Lithuanian Energy Ministry in 2025 set up a special working group on nuclear to flesh out options for government consideration. This followed Cabinet approval of the idea that nuclear energy development should be officially assessed in light of climate change and supply security challenges. The ministry openly stated that Lithuania might need around 1,500 MW of nuclear capacity by mid-century to meet demand growth (electricity consumption could triple from 24 TWh in 2030 to 74 TWh in 2050) and to back up intermittent renewables. By embracing SMRs, Lithuania hopes not only to generate clean power but also to potentially become a net exporter in the Baltic region once the Baltic grids are fully integrated with the EU system. Notably, Lithuania’s vision includes regaining the role it lost when Ignalina shut down – that of a regional power hub.

Public and political attitudes in Lithuania towards nuclear power have been evolving. The initial reaction after Ignalina’s closure was resistant to new nuclear projects (as evidenced by the 2012 referendum where a majority voted “no” to Visaginas). However, the energy price spikes and supply scares of recent years have shifted opinion somewhat. By 2023, 42% of Lithuanians supported nuclear development (versus ~34% against, rest undecided), a support level that analysts noted was rising amid the energy crisis. The government’s careful messaging – framing nuclear as part of a “sustainable renewable energy system” and emphasizing next-generation reactors – is aimed at rebuilding public trust. Also, Lithuania’s firm opposition to importing electricity from Belarus’s Astravets plant (which Vilnius considers unsafe and geopolitically risky) has bolstered the narrative that having one’s own nuclear capacity is preferable to depending on a neighbor’s reactor. All major political parties agree on banning Astravets’ electricity; many also agree that exploring Lithuania’s own nuclear options is prudent. Still, before any concrete build moves forward, Lithuania may opt for a public plebiscite or at least a broad political consensus, given the mixed feelings that linger. On regulatory preparedness, Lithuania is in fairly good shape: it maintained its nuclear safety regulator (VATESI) through the Ignalina decommissioning process and has kept up with international safety conventions. This existing know-how could ease the path to licensing new reactors if the decision is made. For now, Lithuania’s focus is on research and feasibility – positioning itself to make an informed go/no-go decision by 2028 on whether to construct a new nuclear facility (likely an SMR) by the late 2030s. If the answer is yes, it would mark a nuclear comeback for Lithuania, leveraging both its past experience and future-facing reactor designs.

Regional Energy Security and Independence from Russian Energy

A driving force behind the Baltic countries’ nuclear plans is the pursuit of energy security and geopolitical independence, particularly from Russia. All three nations have, over the past two years, radically reduced or eliminated their consumption of Russian energy. In April 2022, shortly after the war in Ukraine began, the Baltic states jointly announced they would stop importing Russian natural gas, turning instead to alternatives like LNG (Lithuania’s Klaipėda LNG terminal and Latvia’s storage) and pipeline flows from European partners. Then in February 2025, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania achieved a long-held goal: complete electrical grid desynchronization from Russia. With technical assistance from the U.S. and EU, the Baltics disconnected from the post-Soviet BRELL grid and synchronized fully with the Continental Europe grid (ENTSO-E). This grid link-up is a cornerstone of Baltic energy security, ensuring they are no longer electrically islanded with Russia and Belarus. U.S. Energy Secretary Chris Wright hailed it as a “critical milestone in Baltic energy security” and noted that it “marked the culmination of many years of effort” by all three countries. Going forward, being part of the European grid will allow the Baltics to draw on a wider pool of electricity in emergencies – but it also means they must contribute reliable generation to the network.

Nuclear power is seen as a vital piece in fortifying the Baltic power system in this new era. A joint statement from the U.S.–Baltic Energy Dialogue in late 2025 explicitly highlighted innovative nuclear technologies, like SMRs, as critical for baseload supply and grid robustness in the Baltic region. Unlike variable wind or solar, nuclear plants can run at high output continuously, which helps stabilize frequency and prices on the grid. This is especially important as the Baltics plan to add large amounts of offshore wind in the Baltic Sea in coming years. Officials recognize that a diversified mix including nuclear will better protect against both physical threats (e.g. if undersea cables or gas pipelines were sabotaged, a concern raised after incidents in the Baltic Sea) and market volatility. For instance, when Lithuania cut itself off from Russian electricity (and banned Belarus’s nuclear power imports), it had to import more from Poland and Scandinavia at times, often at high spot prices. Having domestic reactors by the 2030s could shield consumers from such price shocks and potential supply squeezes.

Another aspect is decarbonization: all three Baltic states have committed to reach net-zero emissions around 2050, in line with EU climate policy. While renewable energy will carry much of the weight, there’s growing acknowledgement that zero-carbon dispatchable sources like nuclear might be needed to reach deep decarbonization. The Baltics have already decarbonized significantly since 1990 (shutting down Soviet industries and power plants); the next leg – moving to fully carbon-neutral power by mid-century – is harder. Latvia and Lithuania still use gas for a share of electricity and a lot of heating, and Estonia’s oil shale is extremely CO₂-intensive. By adopting nuclear, the Baltics aim to eliminate the last of their fossil-fuel power generation while also enabling the electrification of heating and transport. Lithuania’s energy ministry, for example, projects a six-fold increase in power demand by 2050 due to electrification of homes, vehicles, and industry. Nuclear plants could supply the steady electricity (and possibly district heat or hydrogen production) needed on top of wind and solar. Indeed, Lithuania’s new energy strategy explicitly calls for considering nuclear to meet surging demand, noting that renewables alone may not guarantee year-round security.

Regionally, the Baltics are working with allies to mitigate any energy coercion by Russia. In addition to gas and grid decoupling, they have joined EU sanctions on Russian oil and coordinated with NATO on protecting energy infrastructure. The integration of their gas networks with Poland (via the new GIPL pipeline) and electricity links with Nordic countries and Poland (Estlink cables, NordBalt, and the upcoming Harmony Link to Poland) all create a more resilient system. However, nuclear energy adds a domestic insurance policy: even if interconnectors were disrupted, a nuclear plant on Baltic soil could keep critical power flowing. This has military security implications too, given the Kaliningrad and Belarusian borders – energy self-sufficiency is part of national resilience. Estonia’s defense and security community, for instance, has voiced support for nuclear energy as a way to ensure the military and essential services have power under any circumstances.

Finally, the Baltic states see nuclear cooperation as strengthening Western alliances. Partnering with American, Canadian, French, Korean, or Swedish firms on nuclear projects further binds the Baltics into strategic networks. The October 2025 Nordic-Baltic Nuclear Investment Summit in Stockholm was telling: ministers from Poland, Finland, Sweden, Estonia, and Latvia stood together endorsing nuclear energy’s role and vowing close cooperation on its development. By sharing supply chains, training programs, and regulatory best practices, these countries aim to reduce costs and accelerate deployment. For example, Estonia’s choice of the U.S.-Japanese BWRX-300 SMR dovetails with Poland and Sweden also considering that design – raising the prospect of joint licensing efforts or shared component orders. Likewise, Lithuania’s partnership with U.S. DOE will not only benefit Lithuania but could create a template for other Eastern European states eyeing SMRs. In essence, nuclear energy has become part of the Baltic strategy to integrate with the Euro-Atlantic community and reduce any lingering energy dependence on the East. If successful, by the mid-2030s the Baltics would have an energy system that is simultaneously more autonomous, greener, and tightly interconnected with their EU and NATO neighbors – a far cry from the Russia-dependent landscape of just a decade ago.

Poland’s Nuclear Projects: A Comparison and Collaboration

Just south of the Baltics, Poland is undergoing its own nuclear energy renaissance – one that both contrasts with and complements the Baltic plans. Poland historically relied on coal for roughly 70–80% of its electricity, but now views nuclear power as indispensable for phasing out coal, meeting EU climate goals, and enhancing energy security. After years of deliberation, Poland’s government launched an ambitious Nuclear Power Program (PPEJ) targeting 6–9 GW of nuclear capacity by the 2040s (roughly six large reactors). While the scale is much larger than any single Baltic project, there are notable touchpoints where Polish and Baltic nuclear efforts intersect.

Poland’s flagship project is the construction of its first-ever nuclear power plant in the Pomerania region on the Baltic Sea coast. The chosen site, Lubiatowo-Kopalino (northwest of Gdańsk), is geographically not far from Lithuania and directly across the Baltic Sea from Sweden – emphasizing the regional dimension of Poland’s nuclear venture. In 2022, Warsaw selected U.S.-based Westinghouse to supply its proven AP1000 pressurized-water reactor technology for this plant. Poland plans to build three AP1000 units at Lubiatowo-Kopalino, each around 1,100 MW, with a target of the first reactor starting up in 2036. By August 2025, significant progress had been made: in-depth geological surveys of the site’s ground conditions were completed, involving 30 drilling rigs, 22 km of boreholes, and thousands of soil tests. The results confirmed the coastal site’s suitability (mainly stable clay and sand, no bedrock obstacles) and will feed into the plant’s safety case. Construction of Poland’s first unit is scheduled to begin in 2028 after permits, with a second and third unit following in staggered sequence. The consortium building it includes Westinghouse and Bechtel – an American pairing that the Baltic states also watch closely as a gold standard for nuclear project execution.

From a Baltic perspective, Poland’s nuclear program is both a model and a potential energy source. The Baltics have been observing how Poland set up its regulatory framework, conducted site selection, and is managing financing for this multi-billion euro project. There have been knowledge exchanges through EU forums and the Partnership for Transatlantic Energy Cooperation (P-TEC), where U.S. and European partners encourage cross-border collaboration on nuclear. For example, Polish and Baltic ministers jointly emphasize the need for “close cooperation on development and deployment” of nuclear plants in the region. One practical area of collaboration could be grid infrastructure: the Harmony Link, a new undersea high-voltage DC cable being built between Poland and Lithuania, will by ~2026 allow high-capacity power trade between Poland and the Baltic grid. Once Poland’s reactors come online, surplus nuclear electricity could be exported via this link to Lithuania (and onwards to Latvia-Estonia) to help cover Baltic demand or balance intermittent renewables. Conversely, if the Baltics build SMRs that produce more than they need at times, Poland could import some carbon-free electricity from its neighbors. In essence, a Baltic-Polish energy interchange is emerging, underpinned by both renewable and nuclear projects, that enhances regional resilience against any one supplier or source.

Poland is also exploring SMRs like the Baltics, which opens another avenue for shared lessons. Polish companies Orlen and Synthos have a joint venture (Orlen Synthos Green Energy) aiming to deploy the same GE Hitachi BWRX-300 SMRs that Estonia chose, with hopes to have the first Polish SMR operational by the early 2030s. In fact, Poland, Estonia and Sweden are all evaluating the BWRX-300, raising the possibility of coordinated design assessment and even a joint supply chain in the Baltic Sea area. Great minds are already connecting: in 2025, Finland’s Fortum and GE Hitachi signed an agreement to work on BWRX-300 licensing in both Finland and Sweden, and this could benefit Estonia’s and Poland’s plans as well, since a reactor design approved in one country can smooth the path in another. Additionally, Poland’s energy utility PGE and private firm ZE PAK have teamed with Korea’s KHNP to potentially build APR1400 reactors at a second Polish site (Patnow), targeted for the late 2030s – an initiative from which the Baltics can glean procurement and partnership insights as they negotiate their own deals.

Politically, Poland’s and the Baltics’ nuclear aspirations reinforce each other. All are motivated by reducing dependency on Russian coal, gas, or electricity, and by the need to meet EU climate commitments. There’s a shared recognition that nuclear energy provides energy sovereignty – a hedge against price manipulation or supply cut-offs. Poland’s strong pro-nuclear stance (across most political parties) also gives cover for Baltic leaders to advocate nuclear power domestically. If skeptical voices in Latvia or Lithuania question the pursuit of nuclear, proponents can point to Poland (and Finland/Sweden) and say: our neighbors are doing this to secure a clean and secure future, and we risk being left behind or reliant on others if we don’t. Indeed, Lithuania has a somewhat cautionary view of Poland’s program: back in the 2000s, Poland was briefly part of the Visaginas project in Lithuania, but pulled out in 2009 to focus on its own plans. Now Poland is surging ahead with a large reactor fleet – a reversal of roles that is not lost on Lithuanians. It adds impetus for Lithuania to develop its own capacity lest it become a permanent net importer.

On the other hand, shared challenges are acknowledged. Both Poland and the Baltic states need to train a new generation of nuclear engineers and regulators, arrange financing for capital-intensive projects, and ensure waste management solutions. They are addressing these through cooperation with experienced countries (e.g. France is advising Poland on regulation; the IAEA is advising the Baltics). There may even be scope for a joint Baltic-Polish spent fuel storage or repository in the far future, as all will eventually face the nuclear waste issue – although for now, countries plan national solutions (Lithuania, for instance, already manages Ignalina’s waste with EU support).

In summary, Poland’s nuclear drive acts as a catalyst and complement to Baltic nuclear plans. It underscores the credibility of nuclear power in the region and opens opportunities for partnership. While Poland builds gigawatt-scale reactors and the Baltics consider smaller units, the ultimate goal is aligned: a secure, decarbonized energy future free from the leverage of hostile suppliers. By learning from each other and possibly linking their nuclear projects (literally via grids and figuratively via cooperative agreements), Poland and the Baltics are together reasserting control over their energy destiny in this decade.

Nordic Perspectives: Finland’s Example, Sweden’s Shift, Denmark’s Alternatives

The Baltic nuclear initiatives are unfolding in a broader Nordic-Baltic region where approaches to nuclear energy vary widely. Finland, Sweden, and Denmark – the three Nordic EU countries – offer instructive comparisons, from Finland’s long-established nuclear fleet to Denmark’s staunch non-nuclear strategy. The Baltics have been observing their Nordic neighbors closely, often cooperating or sharing experiences, as they formulate their own nuclear policies.

Finland stands out as a nuclear success story and a key inspiration for the Baltics. In April 2023, Finland achieved a major milestone by bringing Olkiluoto-3 (OL3) into commercial operation – Europe’s largest reactor at 1.6 GW capacity. OL3’s startup, though 13 years delayed, has significantly boosted Finland’s energy security at a critical time when Russia had cut off gas and electricity exports to Finland. With OL3 online, Finland now has five reactors generating around 40% of its electricity (nuclear’s share jumped from ~30% to roughly 40–50% in 2023). TVO, OL3’s operator, noted the unit alone provides about 14% of Finland’s power demand and has stabilized electricity prices while reducing imports. This dramatic proof of nuclear’s value – coinciding with volatile energy markets in Europe – has not been lost on the Baltics. Estonia in particular sees OL3 as a model for how a nuclear plant can underpin grid stability and enable a green transition (Finland now often has surplus clean power to export via undersea cables to Estonia). Moreover, Finland has exemplified responsible nuclear management: it is building the world’s first deep geologic repository (Onkalo) for spent nuclear fuel, addressing the waste issue credibly. The Baltic states, which would need to deal with nuclear waste for the first time if they build reactors, have been consulting Finnish experts and could potentially even seek access to Finnish waste disposal technology or facilities in the future.

Finland’s forward momentum on nuclear continues. In 2022, the planned Russia-backed Hanhikivi-1 reactor was canceled due to Russia’s aggression, but Finland wasted no time pivoting to other partners. By 2025, Finnish utility Fortum had conducted a fresh feasibility study on new nuclear and signed early work agreements with multiple reactor vendors – GE Hitachi’s SMR, France’s EDF, and Westinghouse – to explore both small modular reactors and large reactors for potential deployment in Finland (and even Sweden)‍. Fortum’s agreements cover pre-licensing and engineering for adapting designs like the BWRX-300 SMR and the EPR or AP1000 to Finnish/Swedish sites. This bold “let’s do more nuclear” stance in Finland provides cover and confidence to Baltic efforts. Notably, Fortum is also directly involved in Estonia’s SMR project (as an MoU partner and investor in Fermi Energia), and could in the future operate or co-own reactors in Estonia. The deep Finland-Estonia energy ties (like the Estlink grid cables and shared LNG interests) make such collaboration natural. Finland’s climate goals (carbon neutral by 2035) also align with leveraging nuclear alongside renewables, a balance the Baltics seek to emulate.

Sweden, another Nordic neighbor across the Baltic Sea, offers a contrasting political journey on nuclear power. Sweden has 6 operating reactors (at Forsmark, Oskarshamn, and Ringhals), which supply roughly 30% of the country’s electricity. Sweden’s grid is already ~98% low-carbon (thanks to nuclear plus massive hydro and growing wind). For a long time, Sweden had a phase-out policy and even shut down a few reactors early. However, the tide has turned in recent years amid concerns over power shortages and climate commitments. In 2022, a new Swedish government (a center-right coalition) came to power on a platform that included a “nuclear reboot.” By November 2023, Sweden’s parliament reversed legal barriers – it lifted a ban that restricted new reactors to existing sites and more than 10 reactors in total. Then in May 2025, the Riksdag passed a landmark financing law to support a new generation of reactors. This law provides for state credit guarantees and loans for nuclear projects and even a contract-for-difference mechanism to ensure investors a stable price for nuclear electricity. The government announced plans for at least four new large reactors (≈5 GW) or equivalent SMRs to be built, with the first two in operation by 2035. Energy Minister Ebba Busch framed it as essential for Sweden’s net-zero 2045 goal and to power new green industries like fossil-free steel. State utility Vattenfall is already doing site studies for SMRs, possibly at Ringhals, though it says no final investment decision will happen until ~2030.

For the Baltic states, Sweden’s nuclear pivot is encouraging – it signals that even countries with ample renewables and past nuclear hesitancy are re-embracing atomic energy in the face of climate and security realities. The Baltics and Sweden also find common cause in opposing Russia’s weaponization of energy; Sweden’s grid was at risk when Russia cut off gas to Europe (Sweden uses little gas but industrial prices spiked). Additionally, Sweden joining the pro-nuclear camp in the EU strengthens the position of countries like Estonia, which has allied with Sweden, Finland, and others in pushing back against anti-nuclear policies in Brussels. On a practical level, if Sweden builds new reactors, it could further stabilize power supply around the Baltic Sea and provide export opportunities (or competition) for Baltic reactors. There may be cooperation on training and safety too – e.g. Estonia could send nuclear engineering students to Swedish programs or engage Swedish regulators for peer reviews. However, Sweden also illustrates political risk: its pro-nuclear measures passed by a slim margin and all opposition parties (led by the Social Democrats and Greens) voted against them. With a general election in 2026, it’s possible a new government might slow or alter the plans. This is a cautionary tale for the Baltics: nuclear projects span decades and need consistent policy support. Baltic leaders might thus seek cross-party agreements or even referenda to solidify long-term backing for nuclear, learning from the Swedish back-and-forth.

Finally, Denmark represents the alternative path – a country that remains nuclear-free by choice, focusing entirely on renewables and interconnections. Denmark famously decided in 1985 to forbid nuclear power in its energy planning, a stance maintained ever since (there are no reactors in Denmark). Instead, Denmark has become a world leader in wind power: as of 2023, wind turbines generate roughly 50–60% of Denmark’s electricity – the highest wind share of any country. In an average year, wind provides over half (54% in 2022, nearly 60% in 2023) of Denmark’s power, and together with solar and bioenergy, renewables account for about 80% of the electricity mix. This aggressive renewable strategy, coupled with energy efficiency and cross-border grids, has allowed Denmark to drastically cut CO₂ emissions while completely avoiding nuclear power. Instead of reactors, Denmark builds offshore wind farms and is pioneering Power-to-X technologies – using excess wind power to produce green hydrogen, e-fuels, and heat. It also leverages strong interconnectors with Norway (hydropower), Sweden (nuclear/hydro), and Germany to balance its wind variability. On very windy days, Denmark exports large surpluses; on calm days or peak winter hours, it imports electricity (which often indirectly includes Swedish or German nuclear power). The Danish model shows one path to decarbonization that avoids the complexities of nuclear waste and safety, focusing on distributed renewables.

For the Baltics, Denmark’s experience is both inspiring and sobering. It demonstrates that, with the right geography and investments, extremely high renewable penetration is possible – a vision Latvia especially shares given its big hydro and wind potential. The Baltics are also adopting elements of Denmark’s approach: all three plan major offshore wind farms in the Baltic Sea by 2030, and Latvia/Lithuania are exploring green hydrogen. However, Denmark’s situation has advantages not all Baltics fully share: it has easy access to Norway’s massive hydro reservoirs (essentially giant “batteries” to balance wind) and is part of the well-developed Nordic power pool. The Baltics, until recently, were electrically isolated with limited reserve margins. As they integrate with the Nordics and build more links (the Baltics support Denmark’s plan for 20 GW of Baltic Sea wind by 2030), their system will resemble a smaller version of the Nordic grid – but still, without any domestic nuclear or hydro of the scale Denmark can tap, they could face reliability issues during prolonged wind lulls or extreme winters. Thus, Baltic policymakers often cite Denmark’s success with a caveat: what works for Denmark may not directly work for us without some firm baseload. Estonia’s climate minister has explicitly said that while renewables are the first priority, nuclear energy is being considered to ensure security of supply when renewables and storage aren’t enough. In short, Denmark’s path reinforces the idea that a diverse approach – including possibly nuclear – might serve the Baltics better than betting on 100% renewables given their starting conditions.

Interestingly, even Denmark is not entirely ignoring nuclear advancements. A few Danish companies and scientists are involved in advanced reactor R&D (for instance, Copenhagen Atomics and Seaborg Technologies, which work on molten salt reactors and floating microreactors), though these are aimed at export markets, not domestic use due to Denmark’s policy. This shows that the nuclear field is globally relevant even where politically off-limits. The Baltics could potentially collaborate with such R&D – for example, if Seaborg’s compact reactors become viable, maybe deploy them in industrial Baltic ports. However, these are speculative and longer-term prospects.

In summary, the Nordic experiences offer the Baltics a spectrum of options: Finland’s integrated approach (large reactors + repository + renewables) provides a proven template for secure decarbonization; Sweden’s evolving strategy highlights the importance of political commitment and possibly state support for new nuclear; Denmark’s path champions wind and cross-border trade as an alternative to nuclear, but one that may require very strong regional integration. The Baltics are effectively picking a middle route – significantly ramping up renewables like a Nordic country, but also actively considering nuclear like Finland/Sweden to cover the gaps. As all these countries collaborate through forums like the Nordic-Baltic energy market and EU climate initiatives, their strategies will likely converge to an extent. Notably, public opinion in the Nordic countries is increasingly viewing nuclear favorably alongside renewables – EU surveys in 2024 showed majorities in Finland (and even a slim majority in Sweden) consider nuclear positively for the future. This regional shift in attitude provides a safer political space for the Baltics to proceed with nuclear plans without feeling out of step with their closest neighbors.

Public Sentiment and Political Debates in the Baltics

The embrace of nuclear energy in the Baltic states is not just a technical or geopolitical issue – it’s also a matter of public acceptance and political discourse. Each country has its own societal context shaping the debate:

• Estonia: Public sentiment here is notably pro-nuclear compared to many countries. As mentioned, about three-quarters of Estonians support building a nuclear plant, a level of approval driven by the clear link people see between nuclear, energy independence, and maintaining living standards. Estonia’s main political parties (spanning the center-right Reform Party to the conservative EKRE) largely endorse exploring nuclear power. In April 2023, the Riigikogu even formed a Nuclear Energy Support Group of MPs to push the agenda forward. This cross-party consensus meant that the June 2024 parliamentary resolution on nuclear passed with broad support, sending a strong signal of political will. Opposition in Estonia comes primarily from environmental activists and the small Green Party, who argue Estonia should focus solely on renewables and energy saving. They raise concerns about nuclear waste disposal and potential impacts on the Baltic Sea if a coastal reactor is built. However, Estonia has been proactive on these fronts – even examining innovative waste solutions like deep borehole repositories (a 2021 study found Estonia’s geology could safely host deep borehole disposal for SMR waste). Fermi Energia’s strategy of engaging local communities early – getting town councils on board and addressing safety questions – has so far kept NIMBY-style opposition at bay. Of course, as the project moves from paper to reality (when a specific site is named, and construction looms), public scrutiny will intensify. Estonia plans extensive public consultations during the spatial planning and EIA process through 2027, which will be crucial for maintaining trust. For now, though, Estonia’s public and political climate appears favorable for nuclear, seeing it as a forward-looking innovation rather than a dangerous relic. This is buoyed by the fact that Estonia has no direct negative history with nuclear (unlike Lithuania with Ignalina’s shutdown) and by rising energy nationalism post-2022.
• Latvia: Here, public opinion is not yet well-formed on nuclear power. Historically, Latvians have been proud of their green electricity (the Daugava River hydropower dams) and have not had to consider nuclear, since Ignalina in Lithuania supplied the region and then gas filled the gap. Polling specifically on nuclear in Latvia has been sparse. However, hints can be gleaned from Eurobarometer surveys: in 2021, only about 33% of Latvians thought nuclear would positively affect our way of life, but by 2024 that rose to roughly 45% seeing a positive role (with about 40% negative, rest neutral). This suggests a growing openness, likely influenced by the energy crisis and seeing neighbors’ plans. The Latvian government, aware of the need to build public understanding, has taken a cautious, consultative approach. The “Nuclear Energy for Latvia” conferences have involved international experts, NGOs, and academia to discuss pros and cons openly. The Climate and Energy Ministry’s informative report in 2024 was also made public, and parliamentary debates are televised, helping to demystify the issue. Still, concerns in Latvia are significant. The country has a strong environmental NGO community and memories of fallout from Chernobyl (1986) which affected Latvia as well. These factors feed a narrative among skeptics that nuclear is inherently risky and that Latvia, being in a seismic-free but geopolitically tense region, could be vulnerable if a plant were targeted in conflict (especially with the example of Zaporizhzhia in Ukraine being held hostage by invaders). Moreover, there’s recognition that Latvia would depend on foreign technology and expertise for nuclear – something that might rankle nationalists who prefer homegrown solutions like wind or biomass. Cost is another sticking point: opponents argue that nuclear’s high upfront costs and long build time are ill-suited for a small economy like Latvia’s, potentially leading to higher electricity prices or debt, whereas wind and solar costs are falling. Politically, the ruling center-right parties seem open to nuclear, but some opposition figures, especially from the Green Party and left-leaning factions, question it. To proceed, the government will likely require a broad political agreement or at least no veto from major parties, to ensure continuity beyond electoral cycles. A national referendum is also a possibility if public opinion remains divided; the precedent is Lithuania’s 2012 referendum.
• Lithuania: Public opinion here is the most complex, given the country’s direct past with nuclear energy. The closure of Ignalina was bittersweet – people feared energy dependence and higher costs, which did materialize (electricity prices rose and Lithuania started importing ~70% of its power), but there was also relief at eliminating Soviet-era safety risks and meeting EU standards. The proposed new Visaginas reactor in the 2010s had support from the government and international partners, yet in the October 2012 advisory referendum, 62.7% voted against it (though turnout was low, ~52%). The result reflected concerns about cost, corruption, and whether a small country should undertake such a mega-project, especially right after the Fukushima accident in 2011 which heightened safety fears. Since then, a generation has passed with no nuclear power in Lithuania, but not without nuclear issues – Astravets in Belarus has been a contentious subject, with Lithuanian public opinion strongly viewing that plant as unsafe (over 90% distrust Belarus’s handling of it, surveys show). This external threat has ironically made some Lithuanians more favorable to having their own modern and EU-regulated reactor, which they would trust far more than Astravets. Recent polls (2023–2024) suggest Lithuanian society is split to a degree: roughly 40–50% support new nuclear, around 20–30% oppose, and the rest are undecided. Support is likely creeping upward as the government actively discusses SMRs in a positive light. Notably, younger Lithuanians and technical professionals tend to support nuclear for climate reasons, seeing it as part of a high-tech future for Lithuania (this mirrors a broader European trend of rising youth support for nuclear as a climate solution). Meanwhile, older generations and those in areas far from any proposed site are more skeptical or indifferent. The town of Visaginas (where Ignalina is) is still home to many nuclear experts and workers now decommissioning the old plant; many there would welcome a new reactor project as an economic revitalization, tapping into their expertise. Indeed, preserving this human capital is one reason the government cites for pursuing SMRs now. Politically, there is a fair amount of consensus: the current center-right government supports studying nuclear, and even the opposition (including Social Democrats) haven’t outright opposed the SMR plans, though they caution about costs. Any actual build decision, targeted for 2028, will likely require either a referendum or a multi-party accord to legitimize reversing the 2012 public “No.” The government will also have to run a public information campaign to address safety (explaining how new SMRs differ from Chernobyl-type reactors and even from Ignalina’s old tech) and to outline waste management solutions (possibly collaborating with international partners like Finland’s Posiva for disposal know-how). Early signs of such engagement are visible: for example, the Energy Ministry’s outreach emphasizes that Generation IV reactors could “reduce the volume of spent fuel” and that Lithuania is exploring innovative waste recycling. This reframing of nuclear as part of a clean-tech ecosystem (rather than a necessary evil) is gradually shifting the tone of debate.

In all three Baltic states, a common thread is that Russia’s war in Ukraine and weaponization of energy have softened previous resistance to nuclear. Security of supply has become a kitchen-table issue, and nuclear is increasingly seen as a means of protecting national sovereignty, not just a high-tech experiment. This patriotism angle often resonates: in Estonia, for instance, advocates argue that with nuclear, “we will never be at Russia’s mercy in winter again.” Similarly, Lithuanian officials link new nuclear projects to “energy independence day” aspirations – much like their LPG terminal was dubbed the “Independence.”

That said, transparency and safety assurances remain paramount for public acceptance. The Baltics are engaging with the IAEA and EU peer reviews at every step, and they have committed to the highest Western safety standards (e.g. any reactor will need EU Stress Tests, and Lithuania’s plans will surely be scrutinized by neighboring states under the Espoo Convention on transboundary environmental impact). Demonstrating a clear emergency preparedness plan is also crucial to assuage public concerns. Latvia, interestingly, invited an IAEA team in 2023 to review its nuclear emergency preparedness – even without a plant – to identify areas to strengthen in case a nuclear facility (domestic or neighboring) had an incident. Investing in robust independent regulators, training reactor operators, and building interim waste storage will all be watched by the public as litmus tests of whether the countries can handle nuclear responsibly.

In conclusion, while public sentiment in the Baltics is not unanimously pro-nuclear, it has moved significantly in a positive direction through 2025, buoyed by energy security concerns and successful examples in friendly nations. The key for Baltic governments will be to maintain an open dialogue, rigorously address safety and waste issues, and ensure that nuclear projects complement – rather than hinder – the growth of renewables. If they can do that, the public is likely to remain supportive or at least accepting. The year 2025 marks a turning point where nuclear energy shifted from a marginal or taboo topic to a mainstream component of national energy strategy discussions in all three Baltic states. The coming decade will reveal how well public support holds as plans turn into concrete proposals and, eventually, construction sites.

Conclusion

As of December 2025, the Baltic nations are on the cusp of a potential nuclear energy renaissance, each at its own pace. Estonia is leading with concrete plans to deploy SMRs by the mid-2030s, backed by strong public support and international partnerships. Latvia is carefully evaluating the nuclear option, acknowledging it may need to join forces with Estonia to ensure a balanced, secure power system. Lithuania, drawing on its past nuclear experience, is reimagining a future where advanced reactors could once again make it an energy exporter – closing the loop by possibly using fuel from its own decommissioned plant. The drive toward nuclear is tightly interwoven with regional goals: cutting carbon emissions, boosting energy security, and severing the last threads of dependence on Moscow’s energy.

The Baltics’ nuclear endeavors do not occur in isolation. They are learning from and coordinating with Poland’s bold nuclear build-out (three large reactors slated for 2036 in Pomerania), recognizing the benefits of shared infrastructure and a united front in securing Western support. At the same time, the Baltics are calibrating their plans against the backdrop of the Nordic countries’ experiences – taking cues from Finland’s successful nuclear operations and Sweden’s pro-nuclear policy shift, while also striving to integrate ever more renewables in a nod to Denmark’s model. Public opinion across Northern Europe is gradually warming to nuclear energy as a companion to wind and solar, and the Baltics are part of this trend, with increasing majorities viewing nuclear as a positive contributor to a sustainable future.

Of course, significant challenges and uncertainties remain. Financing these nuclear projects will test the Baltics’ resources – creative arrangements, perhaps with EU green finance or U.S. support, may be necessary. Building up a regulatory framework and skilled workforce from near zero is a formidable task; delays or hurdles in licensing could push timelines out. Public support, while presently favorable especially in Estonia, will need to be nurtured through unwavering transparency and evidence of safety. Political turnover could also affect momentum – today’s energy crisis consensus might wane if, for instance, fossil fuel prices stay low for a period or if a future government prioritizes other energy solutions.

Yet, the direction set in 2025 appears firm. The Baltics are signaling that they do not intend to be left behind in what some call a “nuclear renaissance” in Europe – they intend to shape it to their scale and needs. In doing so, they are reinforcing their identity as innovative, forward-looking nations that leverage technology for resilience. A decade from now, one can envision the Baltic Sea region with new SMR units humming alongside offshore wind farms, connected to a robust European grid – a vision of true energy sovereignty. The Northern Voices readership, attuned to both environmental imperatives and geopolitical nuances, can appreciate that the Baltic pursuit of nuclear power is about more than kilowatts: it’s about self-determination, climate responsibility, and regional solidarity. 2025 will be remembered as the year the Baltics collectively decided that the atom, long shunned, might just secure their green and secure future after all.

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