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The European Commission has been urging executives in energy‑intensive sectors such as steel and aluminium to back a French‑led push to increase Europe’s share of industrial production, according to a letter seen by Euronews. The request was explicitly framed as building a “Made in Europe” component into upcoming legislation tied to industrial competitiveness and decarbonisation.
At almost the same time, Euronews reports that the EU’s “European preference” strategy—favoring made‑in‑Europe products in public procurement and support schemes—is now facing intense lobbying from both EU capitals and foreign partners, with the proposed Industrial Accelerator Act (IAA) again at risk of delay despite being penciled in for late February.
What makes this moment unusual is the tension at its core: the EU is talking about “preference” and “sovereignty” even as it remains one of the most trade‑integrated economic blocs on earth. The Council of the EU describes the EU as the world’s largest trade bloc when goods and services are counted together, with an estimated 15.8% share of world trade in 2024, and the EU as the top trading partner for 66 partners.
So the story isn’t “Europe closes its doors.” It’s closer to: Europe tries to keep its doors open while changing what it subsidizes, what it buys, and what it treats as strategically non‑negotiable.
Why 2026 feels like a turning point
The EU’s own diagnosis is stark: Europe’s growth model is under pressure from multiple directions at once—productivity, energy costs, subsidies elsewhere, and strategic dependencies.
In its Competitiveness Compass (January 2025), the European Commission argues the EU has not kept pace with other major economies for decades because of weaker productivity growth and an innovation gap; it describes European companies as squeezed by high energy prices, a high regulatory burden, and an increasingly “unlevel” global playing field characterized by large‑scale industrial subsidies abroad, while Europe is also “increasingly dependent on strategic inputs and highly concentrated supply chains.”
This is the economic backdrop. The geopolitical backdrop is even more decisive. In the Commission’s 2023 European Economic Security Strategy, the EU explicitly sets “economic security” policy as risk minimization in a more contested world, while “preserving maximum levels of economic openness and dynamism.” It also uses the now‑canonical phrasing: “de‑risk — rather than decouple.”
Those themes—competition, subsidies, tariff politics, coercion risk, supply‑chain fragility—are not abstract. Euronews’ January 2026 reporting on the IAA quotes the Commission’s framing of a “return” to power‑based economic relations (tariffs, subsidies, export restrictions), and notes the Commission’s aim of reviving struggling heavy industry under intensifying competition from both China and the United States.
From a Nordic‑Baltic perspective, this matters because the region has traditionally benefited from open trade (and, in several cases, export‑heavy economic models). The “Made in Europe” turn forces smaller, trade‑dependent states to weigh two instincts that are both very Nordic‑Baltic: security through resilience versus prosperity through openness.
The Industrial Accelerator Act and the rise of “European preference”
The proposed Industrial Accelerator Act is the legislative centerpiece that, in practice, could decide whether “Made in Europe” remains rhetoric or becomes enforceable rules.
European Parliament tracking of the file explains that what began as an “Industrial Decarbonisation Accelerator Act” (later rebranded) was revived in the Commission’s Clean Industrial Deal (February 2025), with the intent to strengthen demand for EU‑made clean products using criteria such as clean, resilient, circular, and cybersecure standards. Crucially, the Parliament tracking page says a key lever is expected to be minimum proportion/component criteria in public tenders and in conditionalities tied to certain subsidies, alongside an initial low‑carbon label (first steel, then cement).
That “demand‑side” language matters. Europe has long regulated supply (standards, emissions rules). The new pivot is toward shaping demand by controlling what public money buys.
Euronews’ February 2026 coverage describes the idea bluntly: a push to embed “European preference” in public procurement and support schemes to counter Chinese and U.S. competition—while critics brand it protectionist and some member states seek a broader definition to keep access open for “like‑minded” partners.
This isn’t merely theoretical. Euronews reports that a leaked draft text lists targeted strategic sectors (including chemicals, automotive, AI, and space) and proposes EU‑origin thresholds, including 70% for EVs, plus other thresholds for materials such as aluminium and plastics used in certain construction products. It also reports pushback led by Nordic and Baltic states warning that a strict regime could deter investment and limit access to cutting‑edge technology from outside the EU.
The Commission’s own Clean Industrial Deal webpage signals where this is heading even beyond the IAA: it states the Commission will review the public procurement framework in 2026 to introduce sustainability, resilience, and “European preference” criteria in public procurement for strategic sectors.
For readers in the U.S. and Canada, the significance is straightforward: this is the EU turning procurement and subsidies into industrial strategy—a policy arena Americans are familiar with via “Buy American” rules, but Europeans historically used more cautiously.
The bigger toolkit behind “Made in Europe”
The IAA is getting the headlines, but it sits within a thicker ecosystem of EU laws and targets already reshaping how (and where) production happens. Seen together, these measures show that “Made in Europe” is less a single bill than a multi‑layered push for strategic autonomy—often with explicit benchmarks.
Clean tech manufacturing capacity
The EU’s Net‑Zero Industry Act aims to scale up the EU’s manufacturing of clean technologies, with the European Commission stating a benchmark that EU net‑zero manufacturing capacity should approach or reach at least 40% of annual deployment needs by 2030.
The logic is explicitly “security of supply” for the energy transition. The Net‑Zero Industry Act’s recitals frame the problem as import dependency and vulnerability: decarbonisation requires complex, globally interlinked value chains, but the EU wants to reduce strategic dependencies while staying globally competitive.
If the IAA adds local‑content or “European preference” criteria, it would effectively become a demand‑side accelerator layered on top of the NZIA’s supply‑side framework.
Critical raw materials and the “supply chain math” of independence
Europe cannot “make” advanced batteries, wind turbines, semiconductors, or defence systems at scale without secure raw materials. The Commission’s Critical Raw Materials Act page lays out 2030 benchmarks that are unusually concrete:
- at least 10% of the EU’s annual consumption for extraction
- at least 40% for processing
- at least 25% for recycling
- and no more than 65% of annual consumption from a single third country
The same page highlights the demand shock driving this agenda: EU demand for rare earths is expected to rise six‑fold by 2030 (seven‑fold by 2050), and EU demand for lithium is expected to rise twelve‑fold by 2030 (twenty‑one‑fold by 2050).
In practice, this is where “independence” becomes technically hard. Mining, processing, and permitting are slow; the Council’s CRMA adoption note underlines the need for faster permitting timelines and supply‑chain risk assessments for companies producing strategic technologies.
Semiconductors as the original “strategic autonomy” test case
The EU’s Chips Act is an earlier example of the same mindset: supply‑chain resilience through domestic capability. The Commission’s Digital Strategy pages state the Chips Act is meant to strengthen the semiconductor ecosystem and help Europe reach a target of 20% global market share in advanced semiconductors.
Importantly for the Northern Voices audience, semiconductors show both the promise and limits of “Made in Europe.” Even with policy ambition, Europe still competes with enormous scale elsewhere. That reality is why the newer “Made in Europe” push is gravitating toward procurement leverage—because it is one of the few tools that can create predictable demand for higher‑cost European production.
Defence procurement and the explicit goal of buying fewer non‑European systems
If your definition of “independence from U.S. products” includes defence systems, the EU has already moved from implication to numbers.
The European Commission’s defence industrial strategy summary says EU countries should, by 2030, spend at least half of their defence procurement budget on products made in Europe and buy at least 40% of defence equipment collaboratively.
The European Parliament’s research briefing on that strategy provides the baseline explaining why: it reports that 78% of EU defence equipment acquisitions between February 2022 and June 2023 were made abroad, and 63% were from the United States.
This is the clearest example of what “strategic autonomy” looks like as a procurement target: when the EU says “Made in Europe,” it isn’t only talking about cars or wind turbines—it is also talking about who builds Europe’s security hardware.
Digital sovereignty: the “Made in Europe” logic applied to software and cloud
Independence from U.S. “products” increasingly means independence from U.S. platforms.
A major European Parliament study published in December 2025 concludes that Europe’s digital ecosystem remains heavily dependent on non‑EU software and cloud providers; it finds that U.S. firms dominate all major software layers and identifies strategic vulnerabilities tied to vendor lock‑in and jurisdictional risks.
The same study’s key findings quantify that dependency: it states AWS, Microsoft Azure, and Google Cloud hold about 70% of the EU cloud market, while European providers’ share has fallen to 13%, and that around 80% of European corporate spending on software and cloud flows to U.S. vendors.
This is why “Made in Europe” politics increasingly spills into debates about AI, cloud, and cybersecurity—not just factories. If industrial policy is about resilience, control, and coercion risk, then software becomes infrastructure.
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The pushback and the Nordic-Baltic dilemma: openness versus resilience
A defining feature of the 2026 debate is that “Made in Europe” has not yet been agreed—even inside the EU institutions that would implement it.
Euronews reports that the IAA is triggering heavy lobbying and that the proposal is contentious not only among member states but also within the Commission, including pushback from the Trade Directorate‑General (traditionally a guardian of open markets).
The political split is also geographic and structural. Smaller member states worry about a European preference translating into higher prices, lower competition, and a tilt toward the largest EU economies with the deepest subsidy capacity. Euronews reported earlier that a group of nine countries—including several Nordic and Baltic states (such as Estonia, Finland, Latvia, and Sweden)—warned the Commission that strict “Made in Europe” rules could have consequences for competition, prices, and business impacts.
The underlying issue is how Europe defines “European.” Euronews’ February 2026 reporting says critics want a “made in Europe” concept that still allows access for like‑minded partners (especially those offering reciprocal procurement openness) and for cutting‑edge non‑EU technologies that Europe cannot quickly replicate.
This is where the EU’s own “economic security” doctrine becomes relevant: the Commission’s strategy explicitly emphasizes balancing risk reduction with maintaining openness and partnerships.
In plain terms, the Nordic‑Baltic dilemma looks like this:
Europe wants resilience (especially after energy shocks, war, and supply‑chain disruptions).
But the Nordics and Baltics are also among Europe’s most internationally integrated economies, with growth models that depend on export markets, advanced supply chains, and foreign investment. A rigid “EU‑only” preference can feel less like sovereignty and more like self‑limitation.
The most likely endpoint—based on how the debate is being described—is not autarky, but a tiered system: “made in Europe” preference for a narrow set of strategic domains, possibly combined with controlled openness for like‑minded partners and reciprocity rules. That is an inference from the conflict described in Euronews’ reporting and the EU’s own de‑risking strategy framework.
What this means for Northern Voices readers in the U.S. and Canada
For Nordic‑Baltic communities in North America—and for Americans and Canadians who follow the region closely—the “Made in Europe” shift matters in three concrete ways.
Europe’s new industrial policy is being built through funding and procurement, not just slogans. The Clean Industrial Deal explicitly links future growth to lowering energy costs, mobilizing financing, and boosting demand for EU‑made clean products, while also announcing a 2026 procurement framework review to add sustainability and European preference criteria in strategic sectors.
Transatlantic companies may need an “EU footprint” to stay competitive for public money. If “Made in Europe” requirements become tied to subsidies and procurement, non‑EU firms seeking access to EU public markets may be incentivized to manufacture, assemble, or source more of their components inside Europe—potentially through partnerships and local investment. This is an inference based on the Commission’s stated intent to connect public funding and procurement with European production.
The idea of “independence from U.S. products” is real—but it is sector‑specific. In defence, the EU has already put explicit targets on reducing reliance on non‑EU acquisitions, and the European Parliament documents how large the U.S. share has been in recent emergency procurement. In digital, European Parliament research describes systemic dependence on U.S. cloud and software layers, which is likely to keep “digital sovereignty” moving from niche policy talk toward procurement and infrastructure decisions.
The more subtle takeaway is cultural: the EU is trying to reconcile two identities at once—“global trade superpower” and “strategic autonomy project.” The Council of the EU’s trade data underscores how deeply the EU is embedded in world trade (and how significant the U.S. remains as a top partner, especially in services). Meanwhile, the Commission’s economic security framework insists the point is not to sever ties but to manage risk in a world where interdependence can be weaponized.
If the Industrial Accelerator Act lands (or slips again), it won’t just define “Made in Europe.” It will signal what kind of Europe is being built: one that remains open-but-guarded—or one that starts to resemble the procurement nationalism it once criticized in others.
