Nordic-Baltic Front: A United Stance on the Ukraine War

This reflects a shared conviction: Ukraine’s defeat would directly threaten their own security.  As Estonian Foreign Minister Margus Tsahkna put it in spring 2025, defeating Moscow’s aggression and securing Ukraine’s independence is “in [our] own vital interest, given [our] geographical proximity”.  Poland’s leaders agreed, meeting with their Baltic and Nordic counterparts in Vilnius: they declared Ukraine’s irreversible path to Euro-Atlantic integration (including NATO membership) must be upheld.

Leaders of the Nordic-Baltic Eight (NB8) meet in Vilnius on June 2, 2025, alongside NATO and regional partners, to pledge continued support for Ukraine. Sweden’s Foreign Minister Maria Stenergard, Denmark’s PM Mette Frederiksen (NB8 chair), Finland’s PM Petteri Orpo and others sat with Ukraine’s President Zelensky during discussions.  Their joint communique reaffirmed that the war’s outcome will have “fundamental and long-lasting effects on European and transatlantic security”. Denmark’s Frederiksen has been blunt: “the most important thing is to rearm Europe”, reflecting her government’s shift away from austerity.  In Stockholm’s countryside last November, Nordic and Baltic leaders (plus Poland) resolved to “step up support for Ukraine”, invest in ammunition production, strengthen deterrence and expand sanctions on Russia.  Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson stressed that “Europe needs to take a greater responsibility for its own security,” noting that supporting Ukraine “which is fighting for both its own and our security” must continue long-term.

Military Aid and Defense Spending

All Nordic-Baltic governments have backed those words with hefty budgets and hardware.  Sweden has dramatically ramped up its military aid: by March 2025 it had approved 19 aid packages totaling roughly 80 billion SEK (about $7–8 billion) in armaments, ranging from tanks and howitzers to ammunition and combat drones.  The Swedish Parliament also enacted a 3-year framework (2024–26) of SEK 75 billion (≈$7.5 billion) a year for Ukraine aid.  Its latest package (Mar 2025) alone added 146 trucks, 16 coastal combat boats, 1.5 million rifle rounds, anti-tank missiles and funding for Ukrainian training.  Denmark likewise committed vast resources: government reports show ≈€9 billion in military support to Ukraine since 2022 (on top of €8.1 billion secured via the Danish “Ukraine Fund” through 2028) and has permanently upped defence spending to 2% of GDP or more.  Norway will provide even more – in April 2025 its parliament agreed to increase aid by 50 billion NOK in 2025 alone, raising the total Norwegian support framework to NOK 205 billion (≈$18 billion). Most of that will be military grants and equipment; a portion also goes to humanitarian relief and to EU-neighbors like Moldova.

Across the Baltic states, spending is equally impressive (as a share of their smaller economies).  Estonia has committed to raise defence outlays to about 5.4% of GDP within a few years – already the highest NATO share in Europe – and argues NATO as a whole should aim for roughly 4% average to rebuild credible force levels.  Latvia and Lithuania similarly hit record levels (each now around 3–4% of GDP).  Collectively, the Nordics and Baltics have been among Ukraine’s biggest backers in absolute aid – around €24 billion by late 2024, second only to the U.S..  Each country has also sent equipment: e.g. Finland and Estonia donated dozens of armoured vehicles and hundreds of missiles, Sweden sent Leopard tanks and anti-aircraft systems, and Norway, Denmark and the Baltics have supplied artillery and ammunition.  In Tallinn, Defence Minister Hanno Pevkur noted that US bases in Italy and Germany are “critical for U.S. global interests” and for securing the eastern flank of NATO – underscoring that these front-line states view American troop presence as integral to their own defence. Pevkur adds: “I do not believe the U.S. will withdraw its troops from Europe,” despite shifting US focus.

• Key Nordic-Baltic contributions: Sweden: ~80 B SEK in military aid through early 2025; Denmark: ~€9 B military support since 2022; Norway: ~NOK 205 B pledged (2022–28). Finland is using €90 M from frozen Russian assets to buy ammunition. Estonia (5.4% GDP goal), Latvia and Lithuania raised national defence spend to meet/exceed NATO targets. All have sent weapons (from infantry gear to missiles) and offered training in NATO programs.

Nordic-Baltic states have also modernized for future threats. Finland, which shares the longest NATO-Russia frontier, has poured resources into its armed forces.  Finnish reservists now practice with new drones and landmines, and in mid-2025 the government raised the reserve enlistment age to 65 – aiming for 1 million reservists by 2031.  Foreign Minister Elina Valtonen reminds Russians bluntly on social media: “Finland is responsible for over half of [NATO’s] entire land border with Russia” and will ensure it “remains inviolable.”  Estonia, too, reintroduced conscription in 2023 and runs large militia exercises.  In short, “the world is changing rapidly… the most important thing is to rearm Europe,” notes Denmark’s PM Frederiksen – capturing the new Northern consensus on total defence.

NATO, Sanctions and International Strategy

Nordic-Baltic policy is also strongly reflected in NATO’s posture. All have now fully joined the alliance: Finland (2023) and Sweden (2024) ended decades of neutrality, and the three Baltic states and the three western Nordics have been members for years.  At the June 2025 NATO summit in The Hague, this coalition pressed hard on Ukraine.  NATO’s final declaration explicitly “reaffirm[ed] their enduring sovereign commitments to provide support to Ukraine” – including “direct contributions towards Ukraine’s defence and its defence industry when calculating Allies’ defence spending.”.  In other words, aid to Kyiv will count as defence spending, encouraging every member to deliver more weapons.  The same declaration redefined NATO’s budget rules: all 32 Allies agreed a new 5% GDP defence target (up from 2%) by 2035.  This split into ~3.5% core military spending and 1.5% on dual-use security. NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte hailed the agreement – saying it met President Trump’s long-sought 5% goal – and reminded the alliance to “shift to a wartime mindset and turbocharge our defence production and defence spending.”.

Rutte (ex-Dutch PM) also reassured nervous eastern members.  In June he told reporters that “the whole of NATO, including the United States, is totally committed to keeping Ukraine in the fight”.  But, he noted, Europeans will now take “more responsibility” for military aid to Kyiv, with the U.S. maintaining a role in intelligence and niche systems like air defence.  This mirrors Nordic-Baltic priorities: they long warned Washington that Europe must shoulder the burden, and now see a realignment underway.  Indeed, NATO’s easternmost group (Poland, the Baltics, Romania) plus Nordic partners met in Vilnius before The Hague summit to reiterate Ukraine’s “irreversible path” to Euro-Atlantic security. They explicitly backed Kyiv’s future NATO membership, dismissing any notion (voiced by President Trump) that such a prospect “was a cause of the war.” Instead they insisted the 1974 NATO promise (to allow any eligible democracy to join) remains valid.

Beyond NATO, the region pushes hard on sanctions and legal measures. Estonia, for example, has led EU efforts to seize Russian assets for Ukraine.  In early 2024 Tallinn passed a law (now backed by EU discussions) to use frozen Russian funds to compensate Ukrainian victims.  Foreign Minister Tsahkna framed it as setting a “precedent Europe could follow.”  By Feb 2025 he was urging the EU to move to outright asset seizure, rejecting any Russian deal that might let Moscow dabble in occupied Ukraine.  Other Nordics supported this push: e.g., Finland in May 2025 confirmed it will spend €90 million of Russian-bond proceeds on ammunition, carefully buying from Finnish industry to both help Ukraine and boost local jobs.  These steps underscore how the North sees Ukraine’s fight as their fight – a point Ukraine’s President Zelensky made in 2024 when he signed security pacts in Riga and Vilnius. As he said then, advocating Ukraine’s defense is “advocating for every country’s own security in our region.”

Regional Challenges and Public Debate

Behind the unity, local debates continue. The invasion has hardened public opinion – Finland’s attack on civilian sites in 2022 persuaded even historically cautious Finns that Russia is a direct threat.  Some Nordic capitals now juggle strong migration controls (partly a response to hybrid pressures) even as they send arms.  Across the Baltics, long memories of Soviet rule drive near-consensus on supporting Ukraine.  A few voices urge caution; for example, an Estonian commentator noted that peace negotiations test Western resolve even more than war – suggesting a durable settlement, not just battlefield gains, should be the goal. (Opinions vary: some Nordics openly call for no deal that leaves any Ukrainian territory under Russian control.)

Security-wise, the region has seen a steady stream of incidents.  Since 2022 there have been mysterious power outages, pipeline and cable sabotage, and GPS jamming.  In June 2025 Poland warned that GPS disruptions over the Baltic – coinciding with the NATO BaltopS exercise – likely stemmed from Russia.  Norway and Sweden have also reported such interference.  These hybrid actions have only reinforced Northern leaders’ conviction that “the outcome of the war will have fundamental and long-lasting effects on European security”.

Finally, in security cooperation the Nordic-Baltic bloc now anchors NATO’s northern flank.  Finland has invited allied forces to train on its soil, and Stockholm’s new government works closely with Norway and Denmark on submarine and air defense patrols.  The Baltics host NATO battlegroups, partly funded by Scandinavia. Iceland, while militarily small, contributes through NATO infrastructure and civilian aid programs.

"North at the Ready”

In sum, the Nordic and Baltic countries speak with one voice on Ukraine: failure is not an option. At NATO’s June summit, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz even acknowledged that “we in Germany ignored the warnings of our Baltic neighbours about Russia for too long”, vindicating their stance.  Nordic and Baltic leaders now fill that leadership gap.  As Lithuania’s Seimas speaker said this spring: “Only Ukraine stands between us and Putin.” In practice, all eight Northern states have backed the horizon to make that true – pledging armies, budgets and diplomacy to a war they see as a battle for their own survival.  For readers in the US and Canada, the message is clear: the North is bearing the brunt of deterrence in Europe. Their forward position in NATO and steady resolve in supporting Kyiv will shape the Atlantic alliance’s future strategy, even as the US pivots globally.  As NATO Chief Rutte put it, the alliance is now committed to “keeping Ukraine in the fight… to make sure that if there is a peace deal, that peace deal will be lasting, will be durable.” – a goal the Nordics and Baltics explicitly share and have worked tirelessly to achieve.

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